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What does the attempted coup in Turkey mean for the country’s politics moving forward? Dimitar
Bechev writes that on the one hand the failure of the coup illustrates the extent to which Turkey has
become ‘civilianised’, with citizens less willing to accept the military interfering in politics. However,
the net effect of the coup will be to greatly strengthen Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s grip on power.
Whatever its perpetrators had in mind, the failed coup attempt in Turkey highlights how far the
country has travelled since the late 1990s. Politics has become ‘civilianised’. A clear majority of
Turkish citizens and elites, irrespective of their leanings and affiliations, believe the military should
stay in the barracks.
The coup was, no doubt, welcomed by some hard-core secularists, but hardly any of them marched in its support.
The Kemalist People’s Republican Party (CHP) leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, denounced it in short order. It was not
that long ago when his predecessor on the job, Deniz Baykal, was calling the army to intervene against the
government’s alleged efforts of undermining secularism. That was in the tense summer of 2007 when Kemalists
were rallying en masse against the notion that a veiled woman, Abdullah Gül’s wife Hayrunnisa, could become the
nation’s first lady. Now the CHP along with the three other parliamentary parties have signed a joint declaration to
condemn the coup attempt.
What is more, years of debating the traumatic legacy of past military interventions, notably the one of 1980, have
made the word “coup” (darbe) toxic. Erdoğan has fought back against the corruption inquiry started in December
2013 by magistrates close to exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen by labelling it a “judicial coup”. When Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu was forced to step down earlier this year, the opposition described President Erdoğan’s decision
as a “palace coup”.
In September 1980, a great many citizens acquiesced with the army’s heavy-handed clampdown on civil liberties,
which was justified on the basis that it was necessary to stop the country from descending into chaos amidst clashes
between radical leftists and rightists. In February 1997, secular supporters cheered when a military memorandum
resulted in the resignation of the coalition cabinet of Necmettin Erbakan (“the post-modern coup”). But in 2016 social
demand for the military to act as political arbiter is limited – a fact which was already made visible by the Gezi
protests.
The coup may have been a last-ditch attempt to stop Erdoğan from becoming the sole ruler of Turkey. Predictably, it
has had just the opposite effect, handing him even more power than what he had before. Tanks in the streets of
Istanbul and Ankara corroborated Erdoğan’s narrative of being the underdog victimised by murky forces conspiring
against the national will (millî irade) exercised through the ballot box. Turkey’s pious conservative majority, the story
goes, has continuously fallen prey to the deep state led by the Kemalist elite ensconced in the military command, the
upper layers of bureaucracy and the judiciary. The democratic process is there to bring Turkey back to its rightful
master, the people, with Erdoğan at the helm.
But the likely origins and subsequent development of the “kamikaze coup” suggest that this narrative is flawed. In
fact, the top brass, by and large, remained loyal to the civilian leadership. The notion that there is a deep state
working against the AKP might have held true in the early years but now, after three full terms in office and several
waves of purges in key institutions, it sounds much less convincing. The party has largely co-opted and merged with
the state machine. The coup will advance the fusion even further. The mass arrests and dismissals of military
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officers and magistrates strengthens Erdoğan’s grip on power. Even if the Gülen movement is not behind the coup,
contrary to government’s claims, its influence is likely to wane to the point of extinction.
The mutiny may be a prelude or stepping stone to constitutional change, inaugurating a presidential system.
Erdoğan will use the momentum to bring on board the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), or individual MPs from its
ranks, to reach the threshold of 330 needed for a popular plebiscite. But even if he fails yet again, what counts is his
informal sway over the political system. Erdoğan’s electoral triumph from last November and the appointment of
loyalist Binali Yıldırım as a prime minister make the executive presidency a palpable reality, with or without a formal
change of rules.
Absent a well-functioning system of checks and balances, is there anything that could contain Erdoğan’s boundless
ambition? Reconciliation with Israel and Russia indicates that if necessary he can be flexible and adapt to changing
circumstances. The series of setbacks in the Middle East, the self-styled Islamic State terror attacks and the ongoing
war with the PKK have all brought back the pragmatist in Erdoğan.
But at home he is “turning the screws” and making life for his opponents difficult. The unanimous condemnation of
the coup will not presage a shift from polarisation to consensual politics. The only game changer could be an
economic crisis of dramatic proportions that could destabilise the government, bring support for the AKP well below
40%, and trigger early elections. But, as of today, such a scenario appears unlikely. In the first quarter of 2016, the
Turkish economy expanded by a remarkable 4.8% of GDP in comparison to the same period in the previous year.
For a number of reasons, Turkey is underperforming and could grow much more robustly. Yet there is no crisis in
sight.
The stars are all aligned for Erdoğan but, as the old cliché has it, with great power comes great responsibility.
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